Well, not really. Actually I.tar.gz. In the gzip’d tar there are 3 files; little IPMI/BMC configuration file sucker, a suggested set of security recommendations that could be checked, and an even smaller program to parse the first program’s output. Because… well, no good reason, actually, one is in python3 and the other in python2. I guess I’m testing your readiness. The programs are pretty heavily commented, especially ipmifreely.py, so […]
Now, a few words on looking for things. When you go looking for something specific, your chances of finding it are very bad. Because of all the things in the world, you’re only looking for one of them. When you go looking for anything at all, your chances of finding it are very good. Because of all the things in the world, you’re sure to find some of them. […]
I’d been asked about my 2nd CFT proposal… here it is, in all it’s wordy glory: darpa-reduxxx. Thanks as always to the DARPAnians and Mudge for the opportunity. Thanks to my IPMI paper sucking my life away I’m behind schedule, but it was always an excuse to play with and understand the tech, not make money. Well, it’s not like I’m a monk, I like money, but there […]
Not all packets are equal. If you send a single UDP packet to port 623 that contains an “Get Channel Authentication Capabilities” (see secion 22.13 of the IPMI v2 spec), you’ll get back a packet that has some interesting features. You can get this by parsing the output of “ipmitool -v -v -H 10.0.0.1 -U user -P password lan print”, but more systems have python than ipmitool, so I […]
Since I didn’t find it anywhere else… Avocent, who makes a heck of a lot of BMCs, and at times (like with Dell’s iDRAC, at least version 6) keeps encrypted passwords in (well, quite possible/probable OEM dependent) “/flash/data0/etc/avctpasswd” (don’t be fooled by the /etc/passwd file) using SHA1 hashed passwords converted into Base64. I surmise this file is used to protect the real passwords that are stored in clear text […]